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Abstract 
 
 This research investigates the conditions under which Turkish ethnic interest groups 
succeed in influencing Dutch domestic policy towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. 
Up until now, existing scholarship focussed on the ability of ethnic interest groups to 
influence the foreign policy of the host country towards the home country. By applying the 
theoretical framework of Henriette M. Rytz (2013) to a domestic context, this thesis makes an 
important contribution to the existing literature on lobbying by ethnic interest groups. A 
qualitative method of process-tracing in a most similar case design was applied, in which 
information was gathered through in-depth semi-structured interviews with Turkish ethnic 
interest organisations. Considering the independent variables material power, identity power 
and alignment power, several conclusions can be drawn from this research. First of all, 
material power does not affect the influence of a Turkish ethnic interest group. Moreover, 
identity power has a negative effect on influence. Thirdly, alignment power increases the 
influence a Turkish ethnic interest group is able to exert.   
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1. Introduction 
 
The Netherlands and Turkey have a long shared history, caused by a demand for and 
the large influx of Turkish migrant workers in the 1960s. Currently, approximately 396.414 
Turks
12
 are living the Netherlands, making it one of the largest Turkish diaspora in the world 
and the largest immigrant group in number in the Netherlands. Moreover, Turkish immigrants 
are known for their political activism. This has resulted in the creation of more than 1100 
migrant organisations in the Netherlands. However, not much is known about the role that 
these Turkish ethnic interest groups play for their immigrant community or about their 
involvement in Dutch domestic politics.  
The existing scholarship on ethnic interest groups seems to mainly focus on the 
influence of ethnic interest groups on the host country’s foreign policy towards their home 
country. Moreover, studies primarily concentrate on United States or European Union related 
cases. In-depth studies that investigate the influence of ethnic interest groups on the domestic 
policies of their host countries seem to be lacking in general. The main purpose of this thesis 
is to fill this existing gap. Therefore, the research question of this thesis is: Under what 
conditions does a Turkish ethnic interest group succeed in influencing Dutch domestic policy 
towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands?   
This thesis will provide an empirical answer and analysis to the research question by 
using process-tracing in a most similar case design. A theoretical framework based on 
Henriette M. Rytz’s (2013) approach will be applied. Three different hypotheses will be tested 
in order to create an in-depth understanding of the conditions under which Turkish ethnic 
interest groups are successful in influencing policy in the Netherlands. The variance in ethnic 
interest group influence will be defined on the basis of two categories of conditions of 
influence: agency and structure. I will argue that material power and alignment power are 
strengthened by identity power, and that these variables jointly lead to ethnic interest group 
influence. Several primary and secondary sources will be used, such as legislative proposals, 
official statements and press releases, as well as newspapers and peer-reviewed scholarly 
                                                          
1
 CBS. Bevolking; generatie, geslacht, leeftijd en herkomstgroepering [Population; Generation, Gender, Age and 
Ethnic background. Retrieved from: 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?VW=T&DM=SLNL&PA=37325&D1=0&D2=a&D3=0&D4=0&D5=2-
4,11,38,46,95-96,137,152,178,182,199,220,237&D6=0,4,8,12,16,l&HD=140523-
1106&HDR=T,G2,G3,G5&STB=G1,G4  
2
 Note: All translations from Dutch are my own.  
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work about Turkish organisations in the Netherlands. Furthermore, in-depth interviews have 
been conducted with representatives of the Turkish ethnic interest groups under research. 
This thesis is outlined as follows. First of all, I will present a literature review. 
Secondly, the theoretical framework that is used in this thesis will be presented. Then, the 
operationalization of this research will be explained. In this section I will discuss my data 
collection, case selection strategy and methodology.  After this I present the analysis, in which 
I present the empirical results of my research in two cases: dual citizenship and the education 
in minority languages. This is followed by a discussion section. Finally, I will provide a 
concluding chapter. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
With the rise of globalization and the growth of diasporas since the end of the 1980s, 
the need for theoretical and analytical studies in the field of diaspora politics grew. More 
attention has been given to this particular field ever since, leading to the creation of several 
theoretical and historical explanations for diaspora politics (Sheffer 1986, 2003; Shain & 
Barth 2003; Shain 2007; Rytz 2013). There are studies on the relationship between diaspora 
and their respective home state and host state, on their political behaviour and often on their 
involvement in ethnic conflicts. Within this scholarship, several authors have described the 
way in which diasporas try to influence home country policies by lobbying in their host 
countries (Anderson 1992; Bird, Saalfeld & Wust 2011; Itzigsohn 2000; Laguerre 2006; 
Koinova 2013; Rytz 2013). The approaches to diaspora politics that have been developed to 
provide a basis for defining the basic characteristics of diaspora and their organisational 
strategies towards both the home country and host country, through the study of ‘ethnic 
interest groups’.  
In this thesis, influence will be defined as the achieved success of an interest group. 
The achieved success being: “(1) the outcome of the legislative process is in line with the 
outcome preferred by the group; (Rytz 2013, 36). A causal relationship between the wishes of 
the ethnic interest group and the outcome of the legislative process, as distilled from the 
wording of a final bill, would prove illustrative for “achieved success” (Rytz 2013, 36). This 
could either mean that the interest group has achieved everything that it wanted to realise, or 
that a compromise has been negotiated in line with the ethnic interest group’s ambitions. 
However, not much is known about the influence of ethnic interest groups that mobilise 
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amongst diasporas and lobby for their interests, even though several scholars have argued that 
they will play an increasingly important role as non-state actors in global politics in the 
upcoming years (Sheffer 2003, 217; Haney & Vanderbush 1999, 341).  Fiona B. Adamson & 
Madeleine Demetriou even argue that the mobilisation of diasporas has become the “preferred 
strategy of both state elites and non-state political entrepreneurs” in international relations 
(2007, 514). Still, studies that take into account the influence of ethnic interest groups seem to 
mainly focus on their impact on the host country’s foreign-policy towards their home country 
(Haney & Vanderbush 1999; Beyers et al. 2008; Rubenzer 2008; Rytz 2013). The most 
prominent examples are the influence that established Cuban-American and Jewish-American 
ethnic interest groups have on US foreign policy towards the home country. By contrast, in-
depth studies that investigate the influence of ethnic interest groups on the domestic policies 
of their host country seem to be lacking in general.  
First of all, a division exists amongst ethnic interest group scholars. One group 
focusses on the ways in which interest groups come to exist; the other group concentrates on 
the reasons explaining ethnic interest groups’ policy influence. This thesis builds on the latter. 
First of all a proper definition of an ethnic interest group needs to be formulated. Jan Beyers, 
Rainer Eising & William Maloney argue from the perspective of non-specific interest groups 
and define them on the basis of “organisation, political interests and formality” (Beyers et al. 
2008, 1106). This means that an interest group should display a certain degree of organised 
“political behaviour”, that it should attempt to influence policy and that interest groups 
“pursue their goals through informal interactions with politicians and bureaucrats” and not by 
participating in elections or by “seeking public office” (1106). Rubenzer recommends 
defining ethnic interest groups as “[requiring] an in-group connection, coupled with the 
feeling of belonging to a common ancestral ‘homeland’” (2008, 170). Rytz’s definition of 
ethnic interest groups seems to be the most complete and applicable definition for further 
research: “ethnic interest groups are institutionalised, nongovernmental political actors whose 
members share a collective cultural identity, to which belonging to the same immigrant 
community is central” (Rytz 2013, 15). Moreover, she argues that ethnic interest groups are 
similar to any other type of interest groups, except for the fact that they share “their collective 
ethnic identity as a motivating force and resource” (2013, 15). Rytz’s definition will be 
applied in this thesis.  
Secondly, several scholars have come up with suggestions for frameworks that classify 
the conditions for ethnic interest group influence, though consensus about these conditions 
has not been reached yet. Scholars do not apply the same definition when it comes to 
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‘influence’. Some authors define influence as an outcome in line with the wishes of the ethnic 
interest group, others define influence as potential influence on the lobbying process (of 
which the outcome is less important) and some do not even define influence at all (Rytz 2013, 
28). More specifically, various authors have labelled the study of influence as difficult or 
complex: the existence of many different external actors make it difficult to define which 
actor has had the most influence or too many different forms of influence are considered 
(Beyers et al. 2008, 1115; Dür 2008, 35; Haney & Vanderbush 1999, 357). What’s more, a 
way to measure the exact amount of influence seems to be absent in most scholarly research, 
except for the work of Rytz (2013). Other scholars have come up with characteristics of 
ethnic interest group influence (Haney & Vanderbush 1999; Rubenzer 2008; Beyers et al 
2008).  
Patrick Haney and Walter Vanderbush for example, extract seven characteristics of 
influence out of the existing literature: organisational strength (defined by “unity”, “a 
professional lobbying apparatus” and “financial resources”), membership unity, placement, 
voter participation, salience and resonance of the message, permeability of and access to the 
government and mutually supportive relationships with policymakers (1999, 344-345). Their 
“push on an open door” argument, arguing that “successful lobbying is likely if diasporas 
promote policies that the government already favours”, is especially interesting (Haney & 
Vanderbush 2008, 345). Their framework is cited in the works of Koinova (2013), Dür (2008) 
and Rubenzer (2008), even though the Rubenzer suggests considering this argument as 
“evidence of, rather than a determinant of diasporic influence” (183). Additionally Haney & 
Vanderbush argue that a more thorough understanding of the concept of ‘ethnicity’ in ethnic 
interest groups is necessary to understand their role in the policy process (1999, 358). Given 
the low number of selected characteristics for ethnic interest group strength and the 
shortcomings in the theoretical basis of their study, I have to discard the framework of Haney 
& Vanderbush. Although the scholars have made some innovative suggestions, their 
framework is not complete enough to be used as the basis of further research.  
Jan Beyers, Rainer Eising and William Maloney come up with an alternative way to 
study the effectiveness of ethnic interest groups, by grouping them into three different stages 
of organisational development: “start-up, the stage where the groups enjoys an insider status 
and the crisis point over the best strategy” (Beyers et al. 2008, 1121). These stages are 
evaluated through the use of two different types of strategies: insider and outsider strategies. 
Insider strategies focus on the principle of lobbying within the system of bureaucrats and 
politicians; outsider strategies focus on influencing public opinion and the media. Deciding 
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how to balance insider and outsider strategies is, according to Beyers et al., the ethnic interest 
groups’ leader main struggle (2008, 1121). The three stages of organisational development 
seem to be useful in defining the type of ethnic interest group under study and to predict 
effectiveness in influencing policy outcomes. However, on its own, the theory does not form a 
systematic study that measures the effectiveness of policy influence.  
Rubenzer’s framework (2008) provides a more solid basis for an approach towards 
ethnic interest group’s influence on policy. In an attempt to generalise criteria to evaluate the 
influence of ethnic interest groups, he identifies two categories of conditions of influence: 
contextual factors, such as diasporic empathy, strategic convergence (Haney & Vanderbush 
1999, 345), relative permeability, public convergence and preserve status quo, and attributes, 
such as political unity, high level of political activity (see Beyers et al. 2008, 1106; Rubenzer 
2008, 171-172), numerical significance, legitimate tactics, organisational strength and partial 
assimilation, weak opposition, financial resources, sectoral dominance and alliance building 
(2008, 171-172). Strategic convergence is discarded by Haney & Vanderbush (1999); they 
explain that some diasporas have no intention whatsoever to assimilate with the host country. 
Rubenzer concludes his article by arguing that “organisational strength” and “political 
activity” seem to be the most important factors for ethnic interest group influence (2008, 183). 
Moreover, he contends that “the barriers for success for ethnic identity groups are very similar 
to those faced by interest groups of all types” and that a large numbers of members is no 
indicator for policy influence (2008, 183). His framework thus seems to be giving a more 
clear indication of success in influencing policy. However, given Rubenzer’s focus on the 
influence of ethnic interest groups on foreign policy issues, significant adaptions towards a 
domestic policy approach need to be made in order to be able to use his framework for the 
subject of this thesis. I will therefore discard Rubenzer’s theory for this thesis.  
The most detailed approach to the influence of ethnic interest groups is the work of 
Rytz (2013). She proposes to categorise the characteristics into two groups: ‘agency’, which 
consists out of three different types of power: material power, identity power and alignment 
power (2013, 8-9), and ‘structure’, which is based on “institutional and ideational opportunity 
structures” (2013, 7).  Rytz seems to have developed a general systematic approach that could 
be applied to other case studies without having to adapt the definition of a large number of 
characteristics. Her case study on the influence of Cuban-Americans has provided us with a 
generalisable framework for the role of ethnic interest groups. Rytz argues that her framework 
“allows for comparison across cases (...), weak interest groups (…) [and]  cases outside the 
United States” (Rytz 2013, 188-189). Even though Rytz’s framework focusses on the role of 
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ethnic interest groups in American policy, it provides us with the most complete approach to 
date. It will therefore be used as the main theoretical framework for the purposes of this 
thesis.  
What can be concluded from this literature review is that there is a gap in the literature 
on systematic tests used to define ethnic interest groups’ influence. Numerous scholars have 
done research on the topic of ethnic interest groups, many influential and innovative, but not 
many have succeeded in formulating systematic approaches towards defining ethnic interest 
group influence or ways to measure the strength of their influence on either foreign or 
domestic policy. Moreover, scholars have mainly focussed on the role of ethnic interest 
groups in the US or EU and all opt for the angle of foreign policy influence towards the home 
country. There seems to be no standardised method towards analysing ethnic interest group 
influence on domestic policy that is relevant for their group of immigrants. The main purpose 
of this thesis therefore is to fill the existing gap in evaluating ethnic interest groups’ influence 
on host country policies. The theoretical approach of Rytz (2013) will be incorporated as the 
main basis for this thesis’ theoretical framework. 
 
3. Theoretical Framework 
 
The systematic approach that has been developed by Rytz seems to be the most 
complete method towards ethnic interest group influence to date. This thesis will build on the 
theoretical framework and concepts developed by Rytz (2013). Gaps in her theoretical 
framework will be overcome by adapting it to the Dutch national and institutional contexts. In 
this section, I will derive hypotheses on the basis of the above mentioned theoretical 
framework in the area of ethnic interest group influence. On the basis of the theoretical 
framework and by testing the derived hypotheses, I hope to answer the research question: 
Under what conditions does a Turkish ethnic interest group succeed in influencing Dutch 
domestic policy towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands? This thesis will provide an 
empirical answer and analysis to the research question on the basis of two cases in which 
Turkish ethnic interest groups have attempted to influence Dutch domestic policy towards 
Turkish immigrants: the successful cases of dual citizenship and the unsuccessful case of 
education in minority languages.  
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3.1 Influence 
 
For this thesis, we use Rytz’s application of James D. Fearon’s (1991) theory: 
“without the ethnic interest group’s involvement, the outcome of the respective policy-making 
process would have been a different one” (Rytz 2013, 34). This means that we look at an 
achieved change in law-making due to the ethnic interest groups’ lobbying efforts. The 
definition of influence used by Rytz is therefore: “the influence over the outcome of 
legislative debates by means of lobbying” (2013, 36). That the ethnic interest group is indeed 
responsible for the policy change will be defined through the process-tracing method which 
will be explained further in the methodological section. In order to define influence through 
process-tracing, we will use Rytz’s definition: “Influence occurs if (1) the outcome of the 
legislative process is in line with the outcome preferred by the group; and (2) the process-
tracing shows that the group directly contributed to the outcome” (2013, 36). This does not 
mean that the group has had no influence when the outcome of a decision-making process is 
not one hundred percent in line with the preferences of the ethnic interest group. The slightest 
alteration on the original proposed legislation must therefore be seen as influence.  
 
3.2 Agency and Structure 
 
Rytz has drafted a theoretical framework that is based on “theory triangulation” (2013, 
2), which means that the framework is based on more than one theoretical perspective to 
interpret data. A total of three different perspectives have been used to synthesize her 
theoretical framework: “pluralist theory of interest group influence as a classical political 
science approach; liberal IR theory and IR meta-theory” (2013, 37). Pluralist theory is applied 
to ethnic interest group influence, to account for a “struggle of power” (2013, 39). Liberal IR 
theory is applied to integrate “the domestic aspects of international politics” and creates a 
framework that explains “political action by ethnic interest groups” (2013, 38). IR meta-
theory, in which meta-theory could most easily be explained as a theory about another theory, 
is applied to investigate why motivations change and to what extent (2013, 42). For instance, 
the intent to “maximise utility” provides us with “the (…) meta-theory for the struggle of 
power among interest groups” (2013, 41). This is based on the fact that motivations are 
formed “rationally and socially”; in other words through “non-ideational and ideational 
factors” (2013, 42).   
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On the basis of these three perspectives, Rytz identifies two categories of conditions 
that can explain ‘variance’ in ethnic interest group influence: agency and structure. Whereas 
these categories are normally applied to states and the international system, Rytz used them at 
the level of ethnic interest groups and the political space within the state (2013, 39). Agency 
is explained by the variance of two types of power that the group possesses: material power 
and identity power. Structure is explained by “two different types of political space”: “the 
political system” and “the ideational framework” (2013, 43).  Agency and structure are linked 
together by the third type of power that the ethnic interest group possesses: alignment power 
(2013, 2). The outcome of the conditions of influence can be summarized in figure 1 (2013, 
46): 
 
FIGURE 1: Conditions of influence (reprinted from Rytz 2013, 46) 
CONDITIONS OF INFLUENCE 
Agency Structure 
 MATERIAL POWER 
 IDENTITY POWER 
 INSTITUTIONAL OPPORTUNITY 
STRUCTURE (= political system) 
 IDEATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 
STRUCTURE (= US foreign policy 
discourse) 
 ALIGNMENT POWER (= alignment of interests) 
 
3.3 Causal relations 
 
Pluralist interest theory is applied to agency. This means that it “allows to account for 
variance among and within domestic actors over time” and is thus “inherent to the group” 
(Rytz 2013, 40). Agency is divided into two conditions: material power and identity power. 
Material power and identity power play different roles in ethnic interest group influence. 
Since material power is “needed to exert influence” (2013, 8), an ethnic interest group will be 
more successful when it has more material power. The variance of material power is 
explained by the power resources of the ethnic interest group and the power resources of the 
‘immigrant community’ (2013, 50). Because material power can vary, it needs to be seen as 
an independent variable. However, material power “does not function independently from 
identity power” (2013, 47). Rytz explains that, other than general interest groups, ethnic 
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interest groups are “driven by a collective identity” (2013, 47). The variance of identity power 
is explained as the indicators for “the collective ethnic identity of the immigrant community 
represented by the group” (2013, 43-44). This “unique” (2013, 47) factor creates an additional 
strength in lobbying: it “boosts these two types of power [material power and alignment 
power], thus enhancing the chance of influence” (2013, 8). Therefore identity power needs to 
be considered an intervening variable. Consequently, two hypotheses can be derived: 
 
H1: The more material power a Turkish ethnic interest group disposes of, the 
more influence it is able to exert on Dutch domestic policy towards Turkish 
immigrants in the Netherlands. 
 
H2: The stronger the ethnic identity of the Turkish community in the 
Netherlands, the more influence the Turkish ethnic interest groups will be able 
to exert on Dutch domestic policy towards Turkish immigrants in the 
Netherlands.  
 
Liberal IR theory is applied to understand the role of structure by using “the concept 
of political opportunity structures” (2013, 40). The “political system” is explained as 
“institutional parameters for interest group access to politics” (2013, 43). Within this thesis, 
the concept of political opportunity structures is defined as the political system of the 
Netherlands. Because this factor will not change throughout the thesis, it can be considered as 
a “given parameter” and a constant variable (2013, 43). The “ideational framework” is 
explained in Rytz’s case study as “the US foreign policy discourse of the executive branch” 
(2013, 43). The ideational framework is “subject to change” and should therefore be 
considered an “operative variable” (2013, 43). This means that the permeability of the 
executive branch can vary and thus has an influence on the variance of ethnic interest group 
influence (2013, 43). For this thesis, the ideational framework shall be defined as the Dutch 
internal policy discourse of the executive branch.  
Alignment power is defined as “ethnic interest groups need to align their agenda with 
the current official foreign policy discourse in order to be successful” (2013, 44). In other 
words, when an ethnic interest group aligns itself with the parameters in the category of 
structure, the group will be more successful in exerting influence. This means that alignment 
power can vary and that it is thus an independent variable. Consequently, a third hypothesis 
can be derived: 
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H3: The more a Turkish ethnic interest group rhetorically aligns its interests 
with the current domestic policy discourse, the more influence it is able to exert 
on Dutch domestic policy towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. 
 
The following figure summarises the causal relations and hypotheses discussed above:   
 
FIGURE 2: Causal relations (adapted from Rytz 2013, 47) 
Independent variable 
 
 
Material power 
+ 
Alignment power 
 
 
 
 
} 
Intervening variable 
 
Identity power 
↓ 
→ 
 Dependent variable  
 
 
 
Influence 
 
4. Operationalisation 
 In this section I will present the operationalisation of the independent, dependent and 
intervening variables of the three hypotheses tested in this thesis. Furthermore, I will discuss 
the data collection methods, case-selection and research methodology.  
The dependent variable is the same throughout all three hypotheses. This is “the 
amount of influence the Turkish ethnic interest group is able to exert on Dutch domestic 
policy towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands”. This will be operationalised as 
“influence”. As mentioned earlier on, influence is defined as “the influence over the outcome 
of legislative debates by means of lobbying”, in which “(1) the outcome of the legislative 
process is in line with the outcome preferred by the group; and (2) the process-tracing shows 
that the group directly contributed to the outcome” (Rytz 2013, 36). Through the process-
tracing method, it shall be evaluated whether the ethnic interest group has achieved a change 
in law-making because of its lobbying efforts. The achieved change should be seen as the 
slightest alteration observed on the original proposed legislation. This will be measured by 
analysing all First and Second Chamber documents regarding the law-making process for 
input of ethnic interest groups. Furthermore, interviews with the corresponding organisations 
will give a more extensive insight into the roles the groups have played.  
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H1: The more material power a Turkish ethnic interest group disposes of, the more influence 
it is able to exert on Dutch domestic policy towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. 
 
The independent variable in the first hypothesis is ‘material power’. The variance of 
material power is measured by the power resources of the ethnic interest group and the power 
resources of the immigrant community. Material power is an accumulative variable. The more 
and the stronger material indicators are present in the ethnic interest group, the more influence 
the group will have.  Indicators for power resources are derived through a deductive approach 
on the basis of Rytz’s list of indicators of material and identity power. Her full list of material 
power indicators can be found in the appendix (table 1A). Rytz has made a selection of these 
indicators for her research: “several conditions were dropped – some due to reasons of 
feasibility and plausibility, others because they were considered contingencies, or because 
they would be part of the institutional opportunity structure, which is held constant” (2013, 
49). Likewise, for the same reasons, a selection from these indicators has been made for this 
thesis. These have been divided into material power indicators for the ethnic interest group 
and the material power indicators of the immigrant community (see table 1). A selection of 
indicators has been divided into several sub-indicators, for the reason that they can be seen as 
important sub-characteristics. Some indicators, such as income and poverty rate are “easily 
quantifiable” (Rytz 2013, 9). These will be based on statistics from government reports. 
Others, such as organisational structure and strategy need more explanation, because they 
cannot measured in numbers. These will be explored and described on the basis of analysis of 
collected data from documents, reports and semi-structured self-conducted interviews with 
Turkish ethnic interest groups.  
 
TABLE 1: Indicators of material power (source: adapted from Rytz 2013, 50) 
Material power 
IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY: 
Socioeconomic Constitution 
ETHNIC INTEREST GROUP: 
Operability 
 Demographic size 
 Wealth and wealth distribution  
 Education  
 Income 
 Poverty rate 
 Financial strength  
 Organisational structure 
 Staff  
 Leadership 
 Membership size 
 Instruments and strategy 
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 Degree of collective mobilisation 
 
H2: The stronger the ethnic identity of the Turkish community in the Netherlands, the more 
influence the Turkish ethnic interest groups will be able to exert on Dutch domestic policy 
towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands.  
 
The intervening variable in the second hypothesis is ‘ethnic identity’. Ethnic identity 
will be operationalised as ‘identity power’. The variance of identity power is explained as the 
indicators for “the collective ethnic identity of the immigrant community represented by the 
group” (Rytz 2013, 43-44). Identity must as well be seen as an accumulative variable. The 
more and the stronger ethnic identity indicators are present in both the immigrant community 
and ethnic interest group, the more influence the group will have. When identity power is 
high, “it provides an ethnic interest group with an advantage over competing non-ethnic 
interest groups, as the latter will never be able to attain this type of power, [it is] an additional 
power resource” (2013, 47). It strengthens an ethnic interest group’s material and alignment 
power and enables it to exert more influence. Indicators for identity power are derived 
through the same deductive approach as what has been done for material power. A selection 
of indicators for identity power has been selected for this thesis (see table 2). These indicators 
shall be analysed through data collected in documents, reports and self-conducted interviews. 
The analysis of the indicators will be based on facts collected from (governmental) 
documents, reports, secondary literature and self-conducted semi-structured interviews with 
the Turkish ethnic interest groups.   
 
TABLE 2: Indicators of identity power (source: adapted from Rytz 2013, 50) 
Identity power 
IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY: Collective Ethnic Identity 
 Integration into Dutch society 
 Naturalisation 
 Language skills (community 
language; national language) 
 Attitude of Dutch society towards 
community 
 Identification with Dutch society 
 Ethnic cohesion 
 Migration background 
 Identification with the community 
 Transnational ties with country of 
origin 
 Community rituals and institutions 
 Community media 
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o The perception of being 
discriminated against 
o The intention to return to country 
of origin 
o Self-identification as Dutch 
 Political mobilisation 
 Political orientation 
 Struggle for political power within 
community 
 Political participation and 
representation 
 
H3: The more a Turkish ethnic interest group rhetorically aligns its interests with the current 
domestic policy discourse, the more influence it is able to exert on Dutch domestic policy 
towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. 
 
The independent variable in the third hypothesis is ‘rhetorical alignment with the 
current domestic policy discourse’. Rytz operationalised this as “ethnic interest groups need to 
align their agenda with the current official foreign policy discourse in order to be successful” 
(2013, 44). In this thesis, the ideational framework shall be operationalised as the Dutch 
domestic policy discourse of the legislative branch. The variance of alignment power will be 
explained by defining the current domestic policy discourse and analysing whether the 
interest group has aligned its agenda with the discourse. The current domestic policy 
discourse will be defined on the basis of the opinions of members of the First and Second 
Chamber, derived from the relevant parliamentary and legislative papers and proceedings of 
the cases of dual citizenship and the education in minority languages. The subsequent 
alignment power will be defined through analysis of the position papers written by the ethnic 
interest groups and their answers in the conducted semi-structured interviews.  
 
4.1 Data  
 
In order to test the hypotheses, I will make use of both primary and secondary sources. 
The primary sources I will use will consist of government documents, such as legislative 
proposals and official statements. Other primary sources will be organisational records and 
annual reports from the ethnic interest groups under study.  
Since not much information and knowledge is readily available on Turkish ethnic 
interest groups in the Netherlands, semi-structured in-depth interviews will be performed to 
gather information required to answer the research question. Semi-structured interviews are 
known for providing “detail, depth, and an insider’s perspective, while at the same time 
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allowing hypothesis testing” (Leech 2002, 665). Moreover, it is “well suited to the exploration 
of attitudes, values, beliefs and motives” (Barriball & While, 1994). The semi-structured 
interviews will include interviews with representatives of the ethnic interest groups under 
study and academics with relevant experience in the field of lobbying and ethnic interest 
groups. The interviews will shed a light on the two legislative cases, as well as the 
organisational structure and identity of the ethnic interest groups of interest.  This research 
technique allows a more comprehensive explanation for what conditions of influence were 
present in the two cases throughout the process, how they were present and how this has 
influenced the decision-making process for the corresponding legislative proposals. 
Secondary sources that will be used are the peer-reviewed scholarly works about 
Turkish organisations in the Netherlands, such as: Anja van Heelsum & Jean Tillie (1999), 
Anja van Heelsum (2005), Marlou Jean Tillie (2007), Liza Mügge (2010) and Elizabeth 
Musch (2010).  
 
4.2 Case selection 
 
This project examines under what conditions Turkish ethnic interest groups are 
capable of influencing Dutch domestic policy towards Turkish immigrants. The Turkish 
community in the Netherlands provides an interesting empirical basis for analysis for several 
reasons. Being the largest immigrant group in number in the Netherlands, the Turkish are an 
important and significant minority. In 1964, the Netherlands and Turkey signed a contract for 
the recruitment of Turkish employees in the Netherlands (Dagevos et al. 2006, 34). This 
resulted in a large influx of Turkish immigrants. The Turks became known for their close 
civic community, political activity and their large number of organisations (Tillie 2004, 538; 
Van Heelsum 2005, 23). Of all migrant populations in the Netherlands, the Turkish 
population has the highest number of migrant organisations after the German population, 
amounting up to 1100 organisations
3
. In 2005, this resulted in having 3.44 organisations per 
1000 Turkish inhabitants (Van Heelsum 2005, 23). That is much higher than their Surinamese 
and Moroccan counterparts (Van Heelsum 2005, 23).    
To test the three above mentioned hypotheses, this study examines two instances of 
attempts by Turkish ethnic interest groups to exert influence over the outcome of legislative 
debates by means of lobbying. In order to provide a broader understanding of the causal 
                                                          
3
 Internationaal Instituut voor Sociale Geschiedenis. Migrantenorganisaties in Nederland [Migrant 
Organisations in the Netherlands]. Retrieved from: http://socialhistory.org/en/research  
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mechanisms in the theoretical framework and to explain variations in the outcome of policy 
processes, two most similar cases have been selected. These have been selected on the 
dependent variable: policy influence (or lack thereof). One of these instances has resulted in 
alterations on the original proposed legislation: the case of dual citizenship. The second case 
has not resulted in alterations on the original proposed legislation: education in minority 
languages. Because the cases are both based in the Netherlands, they are comparable: the 
institutional, political and cultural context are the same.  
 During the course of interviewing Turkish ethnic interest groups IOT, CMO, SICN 
and NIF, it became clear that most lobbying efforts by the Turkish community are performed 
through the use of Turkish umbrella organisations IOT and CMO
4
. Both IOT and CMO 
represent a large part of the Turkish community. However, where IOT only represents 
Turkish immigrants, CMO represents Muslims in the Netherlands of which a large part is 
embodied by Turkish Muslims. Moreover, IOT lobbies for social and cultural affairs, whereas 
CMO lobbies for religious related issues. Since dual citizenship and education in minority 
languages (OALT) fall under the category of social and cultural affairs, the IOT is the 
organisation under study. Moreover, The IOT represents almost all different religious 
movements within in the Turkish community and can therefore be deemed to be the most 
representative organisation of the whole immigrant community. Most organisations wishing 
to influence the corresponding legislation chose to be represented by the IOT for exerting 
influence on policy, instead of lobbying on their own.  
 
4.3 Research method 
 
Within this thesis, three different hypotheses will be tested in order to provide an in-
depth understanding of the conditions under which Turkish ethnic interest groups are 
successful in influencing policy in the Netherlands. In this section, I will explain the chosen 
methodological approach for this thesis: process-tracing in a most similar case design.  
As mentioned by Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, process-tracing “attempts 
to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes” (2005, 6). Moreover, the 
method is used to “see whether the causal processes a theory hypothesises or implies in a case 
is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case” (2005, 
6). By using process-tracing, I will be able to identify and investigate how the presence of the 
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independent variables material power and alignment power, and the intervening variable 
identity power, lead to the successful or non-successful influencing of policy by Turkish 
ethnic interest groups. Moreover a process-tracing method will be useful as it allows us to test 
whether: “the observed processes among variables in a case, match those predicted by 
previously designated theories” (Bennett & George 1997, 5). Process-tracing is also useful 
because it explains how variables changed throughout the process and how this has influenced 
its development.  
The results of the process-tracing analysis of the two legislative cases will be 
compared through a method of “controlled-comparison” (George & Bennett 2005, 81) in 
which two cases have been selected on the basis of a most similar case design. They have 
been selected on the basis of the dependent variable. One case shows successful policy 
influence; the other example shows an absence of policy influence. In all other respects the 
cases are comparable; this will be explained further in the analysis of the cases. Comparing 
them will provide a more thorough understanding of the conditions that have an impact on the 
influence of ethnic interest groups. This will yield a broader understanding of the working of 
the causal mechanisms in the proposed theoretical framework.  
 
5. Analysis 
 
In this section, the analysis of the cases of Dual Citizenship and Education in Minority 
Languages (OALT) will be presented. The analysis is divided into three subsections. Because 
the case of Dual Citizenship takes place in the period of 1990-1998 and the case of OALT 
takes place in the period of 1998-2004, the two cases slightly overlap. Therefore the results on 
the indicators of agency will be discussed together in one subsection. The results on the 
indicators of material power will be discussed first. These indicators are divided into a section 
of immigrant community indicators and ethnic interest group indicators. Hereafter, the results 
on the indicators of identity power will be discussed. These indicators are solely based on 
immigrant community indicators. The second subsection will discuss alignment power in the 
case of Dual Citizenship. The third subsection will discuss alignment power in the case of 
OALT. Alignment power will be analysed by summarising previous legislation on the subject, 
presenting the relevant legislative proposal and explaining the positions of both the First 
Chamber members and the position of the Turkish ethnic interest group IOT. This is all 
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presented through a method of process tracing, in which all steps and lobbying efforts of the 
IOT will be described.  
 
5.1 Agency  
 
The following analysis addresses IOT’s agency in the period of 1990 until 2004. This 
is the period leading up to lobbying success in the case Dual Citizenship and failure in the 
case of OALT. Part of the situation after the abolition of OALT is also described in order to 
show the effects on the community.  
 
Material Power 
 The analysis of material power focusses on indicators of power resources of the 
immigrant community and the ethnic interest group.  
 
The Socioeconomic Constitution of the Turkish Community 
Demographic size. When it became difficult for the Netherlands to attract enough 
employees from the Southern European countries, the Netherlands signed a contract with 
Turkey for the recruitment of Turkish employees in 1964 (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 269; 
(Dagevos et al. 2006, 34). From the period between 1965 and 1976, the number of Turks 
employed in the Netherlands rose from 7,000 to 40,000 employees (Obdeijn & Schrover 
2008, 287). Initially it was planned that the guest workers would stay temporarily. However, 
because of the demands of employers, legislation became more flexible concerning contract 
duration and family reunification (Obdeijn & Schrover, 287). The Netherlands was seen as a 
promising destination. The more money was spent freely, the more the Turkish felt at home
5
. 
Therefore the number of Turkish migrants spiked at the end of the seventies and the end of the 
eighties (Dagevos et al. 2006, 34). Currently, nearly 400,000 Turkish inhabitants live in the 
Netherlands. As a result, the Turkish immigrant group is the largest minority group in the 
Netherlands.  
Wealth and wealth distribution. The IOT mentions that one third of the Turkish 
community still encounters socio-economic difficulties. This part of the community lives in 
certain areas that are less socioeconomically developed, are dealing with higher 
unemployment rates, are less wealthy and have a lack of knowledge of  the Dutch language. 
                                                          
5
 IOT. Personal Communication, May 27, 2015. Appendix F; SICN. Personal Communication, May 28, 2015. 
Appendix G.  
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Moreover, youth unemployment rates in these areas are sometimes as high as 80% (Bos en 
Lommer, Amsterdam) whereas the national average is 15%
6
. According to the IOT, another 
third of the Turkish community is able to manage, whereas the last third of the group is doing 
really well. When it comes to education, Turks lag behind. In primary school, it is mainly 
girls who fall behind. This phenomenon remains to be seen throughout high school. Yet, 
Turkish students are performing better every day and are trying to catch up with Dutch 
students. This is reflected in the increasing numbers of highly educated Turks
7
.  
That the Turks are relatively poorly represented on the labour market, could be 
explained by the extent to which discrimination takes place. Whether this is the case is not 
easy to determine, but it is mentioned in interviews
8
 with Turkish ethnic interest groups and 
by a number of academics (Dagevos et al. 2006, 66; Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 291). 
Moreover, discrimination takes place at every level of education or job level. When it comes 
to employment rates, Turks of the second generation have a higher employment rate than the 
first generation of Turkish immigrants. Still, in 2008, 50% of the Turks willing to work were 
unemployed. Furthermore, 22% of the unemployed received benefits from the government. 
This number has steadily decreased over the past couple of years
9
.  
When considering income, 10% of the Turkish households have an income in the 
lowest income group
10
. Additionally, especially Turkish women of the first generation choose 
to not be on labour market. Also, one in two Turks has an income in the lowest income group, 
only Moroccans get paid less. However, the Turkish do very well as entrepreneurs. Turks are 
almost as often entrepreneurs as natives. Turkish men are even more often entrepreneurs than 
their Dutch counterparts. Of the four largest non-western groups in the Netherlands, the 
Turkish are almost two times more often entrepreneurs. 
 
The Operability of the IOT 
Financial strength. Between 1985 and 2013, the IOT received annual subsidy from the 
government to carry out statutory duties. Moreover, the IOT is regularly granted subsidies by 
the government for project implementation. Before the Law of Consultation of Minorities 
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7
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8
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(Wet Overleg Minderhedenbeleid, WOM), subsidy was provided through the LAO, the 
predecessor of the National Minorities’ Consultative Committee (LOM) (Musch 2010, 102). 
Because of new policy implementations LOM was dissolved in 2013. Therefore IOT is not 
granted state funding anymore. Because it takes more time for the IOT to acquire resources 
and projects, lobbying happens less frequently. In order to advocate interests, money is 
needed. Still, the IOT manages to acquire some money from its members. Every member of 
IOT pays an annual membership fee
11
. 
Organisational structure. The Public Participation Body Turks [Inspraakorgaan 
Turken, IOT] is an umbrella organisation of nine Turkish national federations that is 
represented throughout the Netherlands. These nine federations are: TICF, HTSKF, NIF, 
HTIKB, SICN, DSDF, HTIB, HTKB and HAK.DER.  The organisation was founded in 1985 
with the main objective to represent the interests of the Turkish community in the 
Netherlands. It represents 298 local organisations, cultural associations and mosques. 
Important to note is that almost all significant Turkish religious denominations are 
represented; both Islamic and religions with another origin. Furthermore, the IOT also 
represents social organisations, social democrats, socialists, Alawites, women and sport clubs. 
As such, the IOT is, by law, seen as a representative organisation for the Turkish community 
in the Netherlands. Each federation is represented by two people in the board. Also the 
women's council and the youth council are represented in the board by one member. The 
board elects an executive committee, consisting of five people. They are in charge of the 
bureau and activities of the IOT. Through these boards, the IOT is in constant contact with the 
federations it represents. The executive committee oversees the implementation of the policy 
that is created by the board. The board supervises the implementation of the policy. Every 
four weeks, the executive committee has a meeting. The board meets every six to eight weeks. 
Besides these institutionalised meetings, the board and executive committee have regular 
contact about everyday issues. The board especially has a lot of contact with the president and 
secretary with regards to the state of affairs and short term decision making. The executive 
committee is responsible for informing and being informed by the nine federations. Mügge 
adds that the IOT “does not maintain institutionalised ties with actors in Turkey (…) [it does 
have] ad hoc contact with the Turkish government” (Mügge 2010, 106)12.  
Instruments and strategy. In the years between 1997 and 2013, IOT was a member of 
LOM.  A committee that was founded and initiated by the Dutch government to have direct 
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communication channels with minority organisation and the successor of the National 
Advisory and Consultative body (LAO). As such the IOT became, together with other 
umbrella organisations of minorities, a formal consultation partner of the government in 
accordance with WOM. The IOT held a support, signalling, emancipation, quality and 
exemplary function. By both the government and the Turkish community it was considered 
important to have regular meetings and discussions, especially on topics related to the issue of 
integration. The Turkish community considered it to be essential to have a channel to 
communicate their expectations, opinions and ideas to the Cabinet. For the government it was 
desirable to have one partner with whom they could discuss and exchange ideas on issues 
relevant to all parties involved. Therefore, it was laid down in law that the Cabinet had to 
consult the IOT at least three times a year. Next to institutionalised meetings, the IOT 
approaches the government on its own, when it signalises certain issues within the Turkish 
community for example. Sometimes, the government is approached to discuss concerns, in 
other cases the government is approached for handing over a petition or position paper. 
Besides lobbying, IOT also pressed charges against the government in several cases. The 
degree of collective mobilisation that is present within the IOT is thought to be useful strategy 
in lobbying government
13
. Both the federations and the IOT have acknowledged in interviews 
that their collaboration is essential for achieving lobbying success
14
.   
 
Identity Power 
 The analysis of identity power focusses on indicators of power resources of the 
collective ethnic identity of the Turkish immigrant community in the Netherlands.   
 
The Integration into Dutch society  
Naturalisation. For a long period of time, Turks in the Netherlands were hesitant with 
regards to obtaining Dutch citizenship. This could be explained as a sense of betrayal felt by 
the Turks in the case of naturalization, but also because it meant losing some of the rights in 
the country of origin (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 306). From January 1, 1992 until October 1, 
1997, non-Dutch inhabitants naturalise while retaining their original nationality; dual 
citizenship. This opportunity was seized on a very large scale (Dagevos et al. 2014, 27). In 
1996, 29.295 Turks became Dutch through nationalisation. However, because of changes in 
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naturalisation law, the number dropped down to only 1786 naturalisations of Turkish 
immigrants in 2007. Less than one hundred thousand Turks do not have Dutch citizenship and 
this number is constantly decreasing (Çoker 2009, 9). The numbers of Turks that gained 
Dutch citizenship through option shows a different trend, whereas in 1996 1,359 Turks used 
the option, the number decreased until 2002 with a number of 680 options, before rising to 
2,296 options in 2007. This option gives them fewer rights than trough naturalisation (Çoker 
2009, 7). The decrease in both cases could be explained by the fact that children born in the 
Netherlands from Turkish parents already have the right to Dutch citizenship. Moreover, the 
number of new Turkish migrants has decreased over the past couple of years
15
. In addition, 
the naturalisation process has become more difficult over the years. Language level demands 
have been increased. This has led to people perceiving naturalisation as something elusive
16
.  
Language skills. In 1989 it was concluded by The Scientific Council for Government 
Policy that minority policies in the area of education and labour had failed (Obdeijn & 
Schrover 2008, 292). Migrants lagged behind in learning the Dutch language and as a 
consequence had less job prospects. This could be explained by the fact that hardly any 
pressure was exerted on learning how to speak Dutch before the introduction of integration 
courses (Dagevos et al. 2014, 77).  Also, facilities were meagre and Turkish immigrants had a 
low level of education (Dagevos et al. 2014, 79). Hence, the Dutch government started with 
integration courses in which immigrants had to study the Dutch language.  
Since 2011, Turkish immigrants with a residence permit are no longer obligated to 
follow an integration course in the Netherlands. At the same time, the Dutch language is seen 
as very important by Turkish immigrants. This becomes clear in interviews with 
representatives of SICN, NIF, CMO and IOT. What is more, the IOT noted that they stimulate 
and mobilise people in making the language their own and actually using Dutch in everyday 
life. Furthermore, they still lobby for free Dutch language courses
17
. Other problems that were 
mentioned are that people do not have the time to do a course or that language courses are too 
expensive
18
. Nevertheless, the Turkish community motivates one another to study the 
language and ‘learn how to fly with two wings’. This means that they strongly believe in 
learning both the Dutch and the Turkish language.  
Turkish migrants do seem to agree however, that learning the Dutch language is not a 
guarantee for being accepted into the Dutch society; other things such as incorporating Dutch 
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cultural aspects are seen as more important
19
. Likewise, the Turkish language is seen as an 
important part of a person’s identity20. On average, language acquisition in the Turkish 
community is going really well. Some even argue that it will only take 10 more years for the 
language gap to disappear.
21
 However, there is still a percentage of the Turkish community 
that falls behind in learning the Dutch language. Many ethnic interest groups therefore lobby 
the government through IOT in order to implement certain multilingualism in education 
programs
22
. 
Attitude of Dutch society towards community. Tensions between native and immigrant 
populations have increased since the nineties. The negative reactions of Dutch citizens find 
their origin in the original expectation that labour migrants were only here to stay on a 
temporal basis. In addition, Dutch people thought of themselves of tolerant, but had lived in a 
pillarised society for far too long (Musch 2010, 113; ) . They were not yet accustomed to new 
cultures (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 302). Parties such as the NVU (Nederlandse Volksunie), 
CP (Centrumpartij), LPF (Lijst Pim Fortuijn) and PVV (Partij voor de Vrijheid) anticipated 
on the growing negative attention towards immigrants in order to get votes (Obdeijn & 
Schrover, 303). Moreover, many Dutch were afraid that immigrants might profit too much 
from Western society, especially during the economic crisis. Furthermore, the IOT remarked 
that the societal acceptation process is not as fast as migration movements themselves
23
. Even 
though most of the immigrants are doing really well, the public debate has and still is focused 
on these problems. Shocking events such as 9/11 and the murder of Theo van Gogh and also 
increasing Islamophobic sentiments contributed to these tensions even more.  
Identification with Dutch society. Amongst reasons for tensions from the side of the 
Turkish community are discrimination, paternalism and patronisation against immigrant 
groups (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 296). Their frustrations are, that: “In the area of integration 
you are often told that integration is not a one-way street, but a two-way street. We are 
integrated in such a way that we are better paid, performing better in anything, but we just 
want to preserve our own values. The moment when the political climate gets a tougher tone, 
they say: they want us to assimilate, not integrate. Assimilation is no longer enough for this 
society. That is the point where you get resistance”24.  
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Moreover, immigrants are bothered by the way they are covered in the media
25
. This 
manifests itself in the creation of minority organizations, which was and is seen as a way to 
ventilate discontent with the attitude of Dutch society towards their community (Obdeijn & 
Schrover 2008, 297). This all started with the founding of HTIB in 1974 and many other 
organisations followed (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 297). The diversity of the Turkish 
community is reflected in the number of different Turkish ethnic interest groups (Obdeijn & 
Schrover, 298).  
What is also happening is segregation. The tensions cause different groups to disperse. 
Parallel communities are starting to emerge. Less known but important to note is that many 
Turks remigrate to Turkey. According to the CBS, more than 4,000 Turks of the first 
generation and almost 1,000 Turks of the second generation remigrated in 1996. For a short 
period, between the years of 1996 and 2000, the number of remigrants decreased. However, in 
2004 almost 3,000 first generation Turks and 1,000 second generation Turks moved to 
Turkey. Another 10% of Turks between the ages of 18 and 27 sees potential in remigration or 
have the intention of returning to the country of origin
26
. Reasons for remigration can be 
found in an appealing Turkish economy, a better living environment, fear for tensions towards 
Muslims and migrants in the Netherlands and incitement of hatred through the PVV
27: “In a 
process of anxiety you withdraw, you curl up like a hedgehog and you think of Turkey”28. 
Thus, because of all reasons mentioned, a small part of the Turkish community does not feel 
at home in the Netherlands. Therefore, the ethnic identity unintentionally becomes stronger 
(Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 296). Still, the fact that Turkish immigrants live in the 
Netherlands, does not mean that they do not feel Turkish anymore. Many Turks identify 
themselves with being both Turkish and Dutch
29
.  In 2005, almost 50% of Turkish immigrants 
identified himself as being mainly or completely Turkish; 40% identified himself equally as 
Turkish and Dutch and 12% identified mostly with being Dutch (Dagevos et al. 2014, 63).  
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Ethnic cohesion  
Migration background. Because the central and eastern regions of Turkey were less 
developed in the seventies, many Turkish people from those regions migrated to the 
Netherlands. Two third of the migrants came from rural areas (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 
285). Migration took place in two separate waves. The first wave started in 1964 with the 
signing of the recruitment contract with Turkey, peaked in 1980 and dropped sharply towards 
1984 because of a period of economic recession. This wave mainly exists of Turkish labour 
migrants. The second wave started in 1984, peaked around 1990 and slowly dropped towards 
1994. This wave is explained by family reunification and marriage migration (Dagevos et al. 
2014, 34). The religious backgrounds of Turkish immigrants can be seen as heterogeneous.  
Identification with the community. According to the Turkish ethnic interest groups, the 
Turkish community is at least as diverse as the Dutch community. There are many ethno-
religious, political and sectarian divisions between the group: “Struggle is perhaps putting it 
too hard, but tensions in the region continue here. To avoid conflict, the IOT does not discuss 
religious or Turkish political issues within the organization. Individual freedom is paramount. 
It is about the right to be who you want to be and how you want to live. On that basis we 
defend each other”30. Moreover, it is added that there are no irreconcilable differences 
between the Turks. The elbow work that happened between previous generations is occurring 
less and less in younger generations
31
. Other sources are a bit more critical about the relations 
between different Turkish groups: "They are at each other's throats constantly (...). They may 
not like each other, but together they pretend to work really well together. (...) They need each 
other; the one cannot exist without the other. While they cannot tolerate each other, they just 
are not strong enough on their own.”32 Thus, despite the differences within the Turkish 
community and because of necessity, cooperation is taking place in umbrella organisation. 
The highly overlapping network of organisations shows how densely organised and cohesive 
the community is, despite its differences (see figure 1A in Appendix A). According to 
academics Fennema & Tillie: “The denser the networks between ethnic organisations, that is, 
the more ethnic organisations are horizontally connected to each other, the greater the degree 
of ethnic civic community” (Tillie 2004, 531). Given the number of organisations and the 
density of the network, the degree of ethnic civic community in the Turkish community can 
be interpreted as being large.  
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Transnational ties with country of origin. According to Dutch government reports, 
Turkish organisations and networks extend over borders. Therefore, they are seen as an 
integration barrier (Sunier & Landman 2014, 15). Mügge explains, that “most migrant 
organisations were founded in the 1970s on the initiative of the Turkish state and 
representatives of political parties in response to developments in Turkey” (Mügge 2010, 
178). This is an indication of the intensive interference of the Turkish authorities with the 
Turkish communities in Europe (Sunier & Landman 2014, 4). However, the Turkish state 
seems to have weakened the ties a bit: “The Turkish state and political parties no longer try to 
control former citizens as they once did” (Mügge 2010, 179). It appears that the Turkish 
government has chosen a different tactic towards Turkish migrants. The Turkish state has, in 
recent years, developed a policy to attract Turks in diasporas to their side. This resulted in the 
establishment of a Ministry of Turks Abroad and Related Communities (Yurtdışı Türkler ve 
Akraba Toplulukları Başkanlığı). The success of the initiatives undertaken by the Turkish 
Government to maintain ties with compatriots in Europe depends on the extent to which 
actors orientate themselves toward Turkey and especially what that orientation entails (Sunier 
& Landman 2014, 49). Ties with Turkey are still seen as important; however Turkish ethnic 
organisations in the Netherlands have become more Dutch throughout the years. Mügge even 
goes as far as arguing that “there is no indication that maintaining interest in homeland 
politics today hinders political integration or threatens Dutch democracy” (2010, 180).  
Community rituals and institutions. A means to keep the Turkish community together 
was the creation of Turkish ethnic organisations. As mentioned earlier on, many of the 
organisations that were founded in 1970s were initiated by the Turkish state (Mügge 2010, 
178). This has created a strong civic community (Van Heelsum 2005, 21). Noteworthy is that 
the largest interconnected network of Turkish organisations “consists of 150 organisations” 
(Van Heelsum 2005, 23). A second reason for the creation of Turkish organisations would be 
a way to ventilate discontent with Dutch society (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 297).  A final 
reason for creating this large number of organisation would be a certain cultural characteristic 
that motivates Turks to organises themselves. This characteristic is mentioned by Anja van 
Heelsum (2005, 29), but also in interviews with informants and Turkish ethnic interest 
groups: “Turks see themselves as being venturesome; they want to think along and have a 
say”33. Others see the dominance of the Turks in the Ottoman era, as the onset of wanting to 
be in power and organise
34
.   
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Community media. The use of Turkish media strengthens the ethnic cohesion of the 
community. Amongst Turkish youths, Dutch television is not the most used information 
source; more popular is the use of Turkish television
35
. In 2010, approximately 72% watched 
Dutch TV, 86 % watched Turkish TV. This also confirmed by Turkish ethnic interest groups. 
According to them three quarters of the Turkish community has a satellite antenna or a digital 
receiver through which they can watch news from local news stations in Turkey
36
. Turks 
mainly watch state broadcaster TRT International, ATV, Kanal D and Show TV. Dutch radio 
broadcasting is less popular amongst Turkish immigrants than amongst the Dutch. Dutch 
newspapers on the other hand are read almost as often by Turkish youth (76%) as by Dutch 
natives (81%); amongst adult Turks, newspaper are only read by 30%
37
. However, they 
mention that many Turks, especially youths, pay more attention to social media, such as 
twitter and online news. Their social media use is not just orientated towards the Netherlands 
and Turkey; they also engaged with media of other countries throughout the world
38
.  
 
Political mobilisation 
Political orientation. Immigrants generally vote for more left-wing parties than natives 
(Van Heelsum 2002, 184).  Around 1998, parties such as PvdA and GroenLinks were seen as 
the most popular parties for Turkish voters; right of center parties such as VVD, SGP, GPV 
and RPF were a lot less popular (Van Heelsum 2002, 184). The results of the local elections 
in 1998 show the political preferences of the Turkish community: PvdA gained 30% of the 
votes, GroenLinks 16%, CDA (Christian Democrats) 29% and local parties gained 21% (Van 
Heelsum 2002, 185). However, a change in voting preferences is expected. Recent events, 
such as the expulsion of two politicians of de PvdA, Tunahan Kuzu en Selçuk Öztürk, caused 
a stir in the Turkish community
39
. Voting preferences have become a lot more diverse; 
political parties SP and CDA are gaining ground among  the electorate of Turkish immigrants. 
This is also caused by younger generations of Turks who can identify more with other party 
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ideologies. What was also mentioned is that a growing number of Turks has a hard time 
identifying themselves with any political party at all
40
.  
Struggle for political power within the community. Each immigrant group in the 
Netherlands was imposed to start their own advisory body in the 1970's. Turkish groups were 
thus forced to cooperate with each other. Since the Turkish group was polarised, this was very 
interesting. Turks, who had fled to the Netherlands and other countries because relatives had 
been killed in conflicts between ethnic groups, were forced to work together in these 
organisations. Their religious backgrounds were completely different. Many disputes 
followed during meetings and this is still often the case. They still ridicule one another
41
. 
Turkish ethnic interest groups acknowledge these tensions. Issues such as the Armenian 
genocide, IS and Islamophobia lead to fierce debates
42
. However, it is also mentioned that the 
differences within the Turkish community are not reconcilable. Moreover, tensions have been 
reduced over the years. Especially within umbrella organisations, Turkish organisation 
tensions have been reduced because all organisations involved work together for common 
interests. Working together is seen as essential to achieve their interests
43
.  
Political participation and representation. The Turkish were the second migrant group 
to enter politics, after the Surinamese (2005, 27). This is reflected in the enormous amount of 
Turkish organisations and political activism. One explanation for this is that the Turkish 
government encourages Turkish migrants to active political and civic participation
44
. Other 
explanations for the political activism of Turkish migrants can be found in their strong civic 
community and religious federations. Van Heelsum explains that the active “civic 
participation in organisations of ethnic minorities (…) will most likely contribute to the 
working of the multicultural democracy” (2005, 21). Moreover, she explains Meindert 
Fennema and Jean Tillie’s argument that “the strength of the civic community of an ethnic 
group results in political trust in a community and political trust within a community results in 
political participation” (2005, 21). This means that “civic community and political 
participation are interrelated” (2005, 28). Political participation is relatively high compared to 
other ethnic groups. Jean Tillie performed a study of political participation of four ethnic 
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groups in Amsterdam, in which he found out that Turks participate most and have the highest 
turnout amongst other immigrant groups (2004, 534). A high turnout amongst Turkish 
immigrants is confirmed by van Heelsum (2002, 184).  
When looking at political representation, Turks are represented more often in political 
parties than other minorities. Turkish ethnic interest groups explain this as it being the result 
of several causes. Amongst them are: high political interest originating from Turkey, the 
willingness to take responsibility in the public administration, being familiar with democratic 
systems, rules and knowing how to exert influence on the system and group orientation. 
Furthermore, most Turks are elected through preference votes
45
. What is mentioned by 
Turkish ethnic identity groups is that they do not distinguish between Turkish and Dutch 
politicians when approaching politicians for lobbying. Not only a fear of being accused of 
clientalism is present, but they also have perceived Turkish politicians in the Second Chamber 
to be marginal at the moment
46
. 
 
5.2 Dual Citizenship 
 
Alignment Power 
 
The issue of dual citizenship is seen as a very important interest for the Turkish 
community in the Netherlands. In the analysis of alignment power, the renunciation 
requirement for dual citizenship that was discussed in the Second and First Chamber between 
the period of 1992 and 1997 will be examined. Furthermore, the role that was played by the 
IOT will be studied. The analysis of alignment power focusses on explaining the domestic 
policy discourse at the time and whether the ethnic interest group has aligned its agenda with 
the discourse. It focusses on the opinions of members of the First Chamber, parliamentary and 
legislative papers and proceedings.  
 
The period leading up to the renunciation requirement 
In 1860, a renunciation requirement was put into place for people that wanted to 
naturalise. This was formalised in the Act on Dutch Nationality and Residency in 1892. 
Although there was the possibility of interpreting the wording of the renunciation requirement 
differently, a distance requirement was demanded in every single case (De Hart 2012, 160).  
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According to De Hart, the 1982 act was replaced in 1984, with a new law on Dutch 
citizenship. Furthermore, the Netherlands ratified the Convention on the Reduction of Cases 
of Multiple Nationalities and on Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationalities; a 
1963 Treaty. The treaty was expected to prevent people from holding multiple nationalities, 
but it resulted in an increase. State Secretary of Justice Korte van Hemel (CDA) opposed the 
practice of multiple nationalities. She argued that it would lead to legal uncertainty and 
moreover, that it would lead to inequality between immigrants and emigants, since Dutch 
citizens would lose their nationality when adopting another one. Furthermore, she felt that 
choosing the Netherlands meant distancing oneself from the country of origin (De Hart 2012, 
163). 
Leftist parties such as PvdA and D66 were outspoken proponents of dual citizenship. 
They argued that it would help the immigrants to integrate into Dutch society; that dual 
citizenship would promote remigration. Only immigrants that were allowed to renounce their 
original citizenship were obliged to do so
47
. A motion for dual citizenship written by the 
PvdA and a number of small leftist parties was not able to get a majority vote in parliament
48
. 
One of the demands on the motion was extended suffrage for immigrants
49
. Exceptions on the 
distance requirement were however still allowed (De Hart 2012, 164).  
 
The domestic policy discourse  
In her research, de Hart writes that the 1989 report named Immigrant Policy, written 
by the Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het 
Regeringsbeleid, WRR), led to a new debate about the renunciation requirement. The WRR 
advised the government to promote social integration of immigrants and to improve their legal 
position; dual citizenship. Commission Deetman, founded to advice on political, 
administrative and constitutional renewal, advocated the acceptance of dual citizenship to 
increase political participation of immigrants. Under the pressure of the Second Chamber 
government Lubbers III approved
50
. The government described the policy change as a shift 
from prevention to limitation of dual citizenship. The extension of the right to vote at the 
provincial and national level and the creation of a law for the equal treatment of immigrants 
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was thus of the agenda. The memorandum could be seen as a compromise between the ruling 
parties CDA and PvdA.  
Nevertheless, the memorandum was met with resistance in parliament. This required a 
new compromise. At that point, CDA had experienced a change of thought; dual citizenship 
was now seen as being very problematic; they even feared loyalty problems. PvdA on the 
other hand, was positive about a mix of loyalties and ties with more than one country. The 
new, second memorandum could however be interpreted in two ways: CDA saw a 
confirmation of the renunciation agreement; PvdA interpreted it as an individual choice made 
by the immigrant. When State Secretary of Justice Kosto agreed with the interpretation of the 
PvdA, the motion Apostolou (PvdA)-Soutendijk-Van Appeldoorn (CDA)
51
 was accepted by a 
parliamentary majority of PvdA, CDA, D66 and GroenLinks (2012, 165).  
According to de Hart the compromise was partly the result of an informal meeting 
between Prime Minister Lubbers and the director of the Dutch Centre for Foreigners (NCB), 
Mohammed Rabbae. It was a lobbying conversation. Rabbae convinced Lubbers that 
naturalisation was better for the integration process of immigrants; thus convincing him about 
dual citizenship. This is the first moment IOT actively participated in the process. With the 
assistance of NCB, IOT campaigned for dual citizenship in which they emphasised equal 
rights and connected dual citizenship to religious identity, explaining that the Turks would 
always feel connected to Turkey. The abolition of the renunciation agreement was realised 
with immediate effect. As of January 1, 1992, immigrants were not obliged to renounce their 
original citizenship. The official legislative proposal of 1993 also formalised dual citizenship 
for migrants. In the proposal, it was argued that nationality should be seen as an expression of 
solidarity and that individuals could have political, social, economic, cultural and emotional 
ties with more than one country. The acceptance of dual citizenship could take away the 
resistance against naturalisation and facilitate integration (2012, 165-166). 
 
The role of IOT in legislative proposal 23.029 
 From January 1, 1992 until October 1, 1997 dual citizenship was possible for all 
immigrants wishing to maintain their original nationality. Many immigrants seized this 
opportunity and the number of naturalisations increased enormously (Obdeijn & Schrover 
2008, 306; Dagevos et al 2014, 27). While 29,100 people naturalised in 1991, 43,100 people 
naturalised in 1993 (de Hart 2012, 167). Even though it was considered to be an indication of 
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a choice for the Netherlands, a growing number of concerns emerged with parties CDA and 
VVD (Obdeijn & Schrover 2008, 307; de Hart 2012, 167).  
De Hart reports, that their fears were confirmed in the 1996 publication of the report 
on minorities by the Social and Cultural Planning Office (Sociaal Culturaal Planbureau, 
SCP). SCP stated that naturalisation had little to do with feelings of connectedness with or 
social integration into Dutch society. CDA and VVD argued that naturalisation should be seen 
as a price for a completed integration process, not as a means of integration. Still, PvdA, D66 
and GroenLinks saw dual citizenship as a means to promote social and cultural integration of 
immigrants. GroenLinks argued about political participation; PvdA and D66 still desired an 
extension of suffrage for immigrants. The government still insisted that feeling Dutch should 
not be seen as a requirement for naturalisation. What is also argued by de Hart is that the 
influence of immigrant organisation was diminished; they only had limited influence on the 
debate. Opponents of dual citizenship even described the opinions of immigrants as being too 
small in number and unclear. Politicians started to see dual citizenship as an expression of an 
ethnic and cultural identity (de Hart 2012, 166).  
Because of all the criticism, de Hart describes the situation in which State Secretary 
Schmitz felt compelled to reformulate the meaning of dual citizenship. Schmitz reformulated 
dual citizenship as being a condition one does not earn automatically and that single 
nationality would still be preferred. Even though the Second Chamber accepted her legislative 
proposal in 1995, it was not accepted in the First Chamber. As government Lubbers III had 
been replaced by Kok I (a government consisting of PvdA and VVD), CDA did not feel 
compelled to the compromises made with PvdA: CDA was now an opposition party.  
The same situation is described by the IOT
52
. For the IOT, dual nationality was seen as 
an important issue. First of all, many Turks did not want to lose their Turkish citizenship 
because it would cause them to lose the right to buy a house. Moreover, many Turks felt the 
obligation to stay connected with the homeland and fulfill the obligatory military service; 
some were afraid that they will be forced to go back to Turkey and therefore want to keep 
their nationality; others felt that they might want to return to Turkey someday. It was 
therefore the IOT’s intention to lobby for dual citizenship. Their goal was to make sure that 
dual citizenship would be an option as long as possible, by making sure it would take as long 
as possible before Schmitz’ proposal was reversed. As a tactic they made sure that did not 
make to harsh statements. This was explained in an interview with IOT: “When you have an 
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opinion as an ethnic interest group, you can go two ways. You can object or you can say that 
you are willing to listen to what the government has to say”53. The IOT added that they have 
always chosen the second option.  
 On February 16, 1996, IOT demonstratively presented a petition to the Commission 
of Justice of the Second Chamber, in which they presented the importance of maintaining 
their own nationality when naturalising
54
. Also, the IOT held conversations on every level of 
the political system; moreover it tried to speak with every political party in the First 
Chamber
55
. During an interview with the IOT, it was clarified that Senator Glasz (CDA) was 
‘adamantly’ opposed to the proposal. IOT was allowed to walk into his office. However, 
when they did that, they were told that there would “not be a conversation with community 
organisations held by the First Chamber fraction of the CDA”. IOT was not pleased at all56.  
The anecdote told by IOT
57
 about their response to CDA, shows the tactics the 
organisation used. Former Minister of Justice Hirsch Ballin (CDA) had signed the legislative 
proposal that agreed on the abolishment of the renunciation requirement. Hirsch Ballin came 
from Gilze-Rijen (a city in Brabant) and every Tuesday morning before the meeting of the 
Senate he took the train from Eindhoven. In an answer to the conversation with Senator Glasz, 
the former director of IOT approached the former Minister. While he was sitting in the first-
class compartment, the director spoke to him with a loud voice: "Your signature is written on 
the bill; and then, when you're in the Senate, you suddenly have a different opinion.. and 
everyone could of course change his opinion, but the fact that you're not willing to discuss 
it…!" Because of embarrassment of the fuss that was made, Hirsch Ballin promised that he 
would arrange a meeting with IOT; a promise that he kept.”58 The conversation helped IOT in 
delaying the abolishment of Schmitz’ bill. Because of the delay, the Turkish community was 
able to naturalise and retain their original nationality for a period of 5 years. When looking at 
the statistics, 60% of the Turkish community became Dutch in that period. A big lobbying 
success for the organisation.  
There was a lot of media coverage of the political process. The IOT was unable to 
achieve that the CDA seized the opportunity to oppose the new legislation
59
. The State 
Secretary was not able to overcome the objections by CDA and VVD senators in particular 
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and therefore withdrew the law before it could be rejected
60
. The same year, a new legislative 
proposal was sent to the Chamber, in which the renunciation requirement was kept in place
61
 
(de Hart 2012, 167). Strengthening the legal position of Turkish immigrants was therefore 
again at the top of the agenda
62
. IOT did achieve a number of exemptions for the distance 
requirement (1996). After October 1, 1997
63
 Dutch citizens were only allowed to have one 
nationality. There are however, a lot of exceptions to the rule. Therefore, many Turks are still 
allowed to retain their Turkish citizenship. Current legislation did leave its traces on the 
naturalization trends. Less and less Turks have chosen for naturalization. This might also be 
caused by the introduction of a naturalization test and its costs. Currently, 1 million people in 
the Netherlands have a dual citizenship, of which 227.000 come from other EU countries and 
yet, the debate on dual nationality still only focusses on Turks and Moroccans (Obdeijn & 
Schrover 2008, 307).  
 
5.3 Education in Minority Languages (OALT) 
 
Alignment Power 
 
The issue of education in minority language is also seen as a very important interest 
for the Turkish community in the Netherlands. The Turkish language has a special place in 
the Turkish culture of immigrants. In the analysis of alignment power, the abolishment of the 
OALT legislation will be discussed. I will analyse what was discussed in the Second and First 
Chamber between the period of 1998 and 2004 and the role that was played by the IOT. The 
analysis of alignment power focusses on explaining the domestic policy discourse at the time 
and whether the ethnic interest group has aligned its agenda with that discourse. It focusses on 
the opinions of members of the First Chamber, parliamentary and legislative papers and 
proceedings.  
 
The period leading up to the OALT 
Education in Native Language and Culture (Onderwijs in Eigen Taal en Cultuur, 
OETC) has an extensive introduction history. This is explained by Peter Broeder en Guus 
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Extra (1996). For large groups of primary school pupils, the discipline was introduced in 
1974, without preparation, supervision or curriculum and lacking a legal basis. The OETC 
was therefore a complex task for the government's policy. The task extended to the 
establishment of multilingual education. Because of the existence of multilingualism in 
society, experiences and research data on the education of bilingualism was only partially 
useful. Moreover, there were big differences in the nature and degree of bilingualism of 
migrant students, both within and between different language groups. In intergenerational 
perspective these differences increased, with a shift of dominant language patterns, in the 
direction of the Dutch language. First, there was a two-track policy in which OETC was either 
given as part of the curriculum or replaced certain other parts of the curriculum. Moreover, a 
question of feasibility was present, given a relatively low educational demand. There was 
however consensus about the need to invest in the education of Dutch as a second language 
for immigrant pupils. Policy officials, school principals and Dutch teachers emphasised the 
importance, but were cautious or negative about the OETC. On the other hand, parents of 
immigrant children, minority organisation and OETC instructors, were advocating OETC 
education (2006, 11).  
Initially, Monique Turkenburg (2001) argues, the underlying idea of the OETC policy 
purported that the children of migrant workers in the Netherlands would return to the country 
of origin and that they therefore had to maintain a link with the language and culture of the 
homeland. When it was no longer expected that immigrants had to return to the homeland, the 
objectives of the course changed. In the beginning of the nineties, the  perspective of lagging 
behind became subordinate to a cultural perspective. A completely new design of the course 
was advocated by the commission Allochtone Leerlingen in het Onderwijs (Immigrant 
Student in Education). The committee argued that there was no clear evidence that education 
in the own language had a positive effect on combatting educational disadvantage. 
Educational disadvantages were no longer associated with ethnicity; they were associated 
with socio-economic factors. Therefore, education in the own language seemed to be 
unnecessary. Reasons that guaranteed the preservation and development of minority 
languages in the Netherlands and emphasised the importance of a corresponding policy, were 
mainly of a cultural and economic background. Hence, the committee introduced the term 
'minority languages'. In the memorandum that formed the basis of the new OALT law, some 
of the commission's key elements were adopted. The law came into force in 1998
64
 with the 
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intention that OALT would remain an educational activity placed in a cultural perspective, not 
in a perspective of combating language disadvantages (Turkenburg 2001, 7). 
 
The domestic policy discourse  
Cabinet Balkenende I created a proposal to stop the funding of OALT in 2003
65
. The 
reason for the proposal was that the emphasis in the integration process should be placed on 
learning the Dutch language. The government supporters in the Senate, VVD, CDA, D66, 
OSF and SGP/CU, pointed to reports of the Education Council (Onderwijsraad) and the 
Social and Cultural Planning Office (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, SCP), in order to make 
sure that the OALT was abolished. The council argued that science did not prove that 
education in the own language contributed to the process of learning Dutch. Therefore, CDA  
member Koekkoek mentioned that no funding from the government did not mean that schools 
could not allocate their own funds for it. Still, the first Chamber approved of the proposal that 
stopped the funding of education in minority languages (OALT) without a vote. The fractions 
of SP, D66, VVD, CDA, CU, SGP and LPF approved of the proposal. Fractions of PvdA and 
GroenLinks made a qualification. The law was accepted at February 19, 2004.  
 
The role of the IOT in legislative proposal 29.019 
In August 2004, the OALT law came to an end
66. The IOT described it as the end of “a 
long tradition of respect for the own language of migrants”.67 The enormous efforts to 
improve the quality of education in their own language, in order to ensure better integration in 
regular education, were relegated to the waste basket
68
. People were done with the pampering 
of immigrant groups by the government
69
. It was the time of 9/11, the death of Fortuyn and 
Van Gogh and the rise of Rita Verdonk. The political-social mood of the country contributed 
to the choice of abolition of the OALT
70
. Migrants were expected to integrate into the Dutch 
culture. Learning the Turkish language did not fit into that picture. Migrants were not 
supposed to stay loyal to their home country. Moreover, lobbying without any help was very 
difficult. Since only GroenLinks and PvdA, both opposition parties, were against the 
abolishment of OALT, it was hard for IOT to find support.  
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The IOT did lobby for its interests. Specific proposals were discussed during 
conversations with ministers Verdonk and Van der Hoeven. These were held on January 20 
and 23 of 2004
71
. During the conversation, IOT argued about the unforeseen and extremely 
unfavourable consequences of a possible abolishment of the OALT. Moreover, all 
organisations affiliated with the IOT had a conversation with the First and Second Chamber. 
A disappointment for the IOT was the coalition agreement of Balkenende II, in which the 
abolition of the IOT was envisaged. The lobby of the IOT was not successful; the education in 
minority languages no longer existed.   
 
Discussion 
 
Three hypotheses were formulated for this study. In the following discussion, the main 
findings for each hypothesis will be presented. This will yield an answer to the research 
question of this thesis. Furthermore, unexpected findings will be discussed.  Two cases were 
discussed in the analysis: the case of dual citizenship and the case of OALT. In the first case of 
dual citizenship, the IOT succeeded in achieving the desired outcome of the legislative 
process. In the second case of OALT the IOT did not succeed in achieving the desired 
outcome of the legislative process. 
 
H1: The more material power a Turkish ethnic interest group disposes of, the 
more influence it is able to exert on Dutch domestic policy towards Turkish 
immigrants in the Netherlands. 
 
The independent variable material power in the first hypothesis is an accumulative 
variable. It consists of several different indicators of the immigrant community and the ethnic 
interest group. The more and the stronger the material power indicators are present in the 
ethnic interest group, the more influence the group will have. When looking at the indicators 
of material power, the indicators for the socioeconomic constitution of the immigrant 
community and the operability of the ethnic interest group show the same results for both 
cases. No significant changes were present in the two periods in which the legislation 
processes took place. While the independent variables show the same results, the dependent 
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variables show different results. On the basis of these two cases, it can thus be concluded that 
there is no relationship between material power and influence. This means that hypothesis one 
can be rejected.   
 
H2: The stronger the ethnic identity of the Turkish community in the 
Netherlands, the more influence the Turkish ethnic interest groups will be able 
to exert on Dutch domestic policy towards Turkish immigrants in the 
Netherlands.  
  
 The independent variable identity power in the second hypothesis is also an 
accumulative variable. It consists of several different indicators of the collective ethnic 
identity of the immigrant community. These indicators are split into three categories: 
integration into Dutch society, ethnic cohesion and political mobilisation. The more and the 
stronger the identity power indicators are present in the immigrant community, the more 
influence the group will have. When looking at the indicators of the three categories, the two 
cases show different results.  
First of all, in the case of dual citizenship, the number of naturalisations was a lot 
higher than in the case of OALT. Language skills however, were better developed in the case 
of OALT. When it comes to the attitude of Dutch society towards the community, tensions 
became a lot higher in the period of the legislative process of OALT. Because of these 
tensions, identification with Dutch society was also lower in that period. Moreover the 
perception of being discriminated against was higher and the intention to go back to the home 
country had risen. The self-identification as Dutch was stable over both periods. The category 
of ethnic cohesion shows no differences in the two cases. The category of political 
mobilisation only shows a difference in political representation: Turks feel represented by 
more different political parties in the period of the OALT. In summary, all differences 
between the two cases reflect a stronger identity power during the OALT case.   
The fact that identity power was higher during the OALT case is unexpected. It 
contradicts hypothesis two: it shows that stronger ethnic identity leads to less influence. A 
strong ethnic identity thus goes hand in hand with higher tensions between the Turkish 
community and the Dutch community. The results in this thesis predict that tensions between 
the two groups lead to less political will to listen to the demands of ethnic interest groups.  
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H3: The more a Turkish ethnic interest group rhetorically aligns its interests 
with the current domestic policy discourse, the more influence it is able to exert 
on Dutch domestic policy towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. 
 
 The independent variable alignment power in the third hypothesis measures the degree 
to which ethnic interest groups rhetorically align their interests with the current domestic 
policy discourse. When comparing the two cases, a significant difference between the two 
was observed. In the case of dual nationality, IOT was successful in aligning its interests with 
the domestic policy discourse during the legislative process. IOT wanted to achieve a delay in 
the legislative process. Because their interests aligned with many of the fractions in the 
Second and First Chamber, they were successful. Furthermore, they did not formulate too 
harsh statements in order not to antagonise any political parties. On the other hand, in the case 
of OALT, IOT was not successful in aligning its interest with the domestic policy discourse 
during the legislative process. IOT wanted to stop the legislative proposal because they 
wanted the concept of OALT to continue. However, their interests did not align with enough 
fractions in the Second and First Chamber. Therefore, they were not successful. Their position 
was considered to be too radically opposed to the position of many of the political parties. 
 The fact that alignment power was higher during the dual citizenship case and lower 
during the OALT case can be seen as a confirmation of hypothesis three. More alignment 
power thus leads to more influence.   
 
RQ: Under what conditions does a Turkish ethnic interest group succeed in influencing Dutch 
domestic policy towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands?   
 
 Several conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the three hypotheses. First of 
all, there is no relation between material power and influence. Secondly, it was proven that a 
stronger ethnic identity leads to less influence. Thirdly, it was confirmed that more alignment 
power leads to more influence. On the basis of these conclusions it is now possible to answer 
the research question. When looking at the cases of dual citizenship and OALT it can be 
concluded that Turkish ethnic interest groups succeed in influencing Dutch domestic policy 
towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands when their ethnic identity is not perceived as 
strong and they are able to align their interest to the domestic policy discourse. Material 
power is not seen as a condition that stimulates the influence of a Turkish ethnic interest 
group.  
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Conclusion 
 
 This thesis researched under what conditions a Turkish ethnic interest group succeeds 
in influencing Dutch policy towards Turkish immigrants in the Netherlands. First of all, the 
research pointed out that material power does not affect the influence of a Turkish ethnic 
interest group. Secondly, it was concluded that ethnic identity has a negative effect on 
influence. Finally, it was determined that alignment power increases the influence a Turkish 
ethnic interest group is able to exert.  
 Empirically, this thesis made several contributions. Whereas existing scholarship on 
the influence of ethnic interest groups mainly focusses on the influence on the host country´s 
foreign policy towards the home country, this research focusses on the influence of ethnic 
interest groups on the host country’s domestic policy. Furthermore, research on the influence 
of ethnic interest groups on domestic policy of the host country was up until this research not 
conducted. Moreover, the study concentrates on the case of Turkish ethnic interest groups in 
the Netherlands, while existing scholarship concentrates on United States or European Union 
related cases. In addition, this research gives some useful insights into the lobbying activities 
of Turkish ethnic interest groups in the Netherlands. Theoretically, this research project has 
provided an adaption of the framework of Henriette M. Rytz. While her theoretical framework 
was built for the analysis of influence on foreign policy, my theoretical framework focusses 
on domestic policy. In addition, this thesis proves to be a test for the generalisability of Rytz´s 
research, as not all of her hypotheses were confirmed.  
 When considering limitations of this thesis, a number of comments can be made. First 
of all, it appears that the context in which the legislative proposal is discussed, is much more 
important than was initially expected. Sentiments in society might have had a bigger influence 
on the outcome of the legislative process than the theoretical framework accounts for. This is 
reflected in the fact that the IOT was unable to exert influence on the OALT legislation. It 
proved that a strong ethnic identity had a negative effect on the influence exerted by the 
Turkish ethnic interest group.  Because of the negative sentiments in Dutch society towards 
immigrants, politicians might not have been as cooperative as they would have been  if the 
sentiments were more positive. Secondly, the achievement of the IOT in dual citizenship 
legislation could be explained by the fact that the delay of the legislation affected more people 
than just the Turkish immigrant group. This research does not account for any lobbying 
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efforts by other groups. Furthermore, the Dutch government might have been hesitant to 
change dual citizenship legislation as it falls under EU law.  
 Finally, some recommendations follow from this research. The achievement of the 
IOT in dual citizenship legislation shows that ethnic interest groups that aim to influence 
domestic policy are advised to lobby for a bigger target group. Moreover, ethnic interest 
groups that lobby for communities towards which negative sentiments exists, are better off 
choosing backchannels as a means to influence lawmakers. The abolishment of OALT 
legislation might have been caused by the fact that it was so openly discussed in the media; 
politicians might not have dared to support immigrant groups.  
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10. Appendices 
Appendix A: TABLE 1A: “The assumed conditions of ethnic interest group influence based on the 
state of art” (Rytz 2013, 30-31).  
(1) DOMESTIC AND 
INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL 
CONTEXT 
(2) IMMIGRANT COMMUNITY  
 
 Host society’s perception of 
immigrant community 
 Generational factor 
Political behaviour 
 Political attitudes: 
 Unity in attitudes toward 
country of origin? 
 Interest in politics of country 
of origin?  
 Motivation for political 
activism (e.g., collective 
memory of persecution)? 
 Political culture: 
 Election turnout 
 Significance as voting bloc 
 Political skills and experience:  
 Political experience, e.g. 
gained on local level 
 Understanding of how political 
system of country of settlement 
works 
 Entrepreneurial spirit 
 Ability to mobilise  
Socioeconomic characteristics 
 Size 
 Wealth 
 Geographical concentration 
 “Suburbanisation” 
Collective identity 
 Background of migration: e.g. 
economic migrant, refugee 
 Ethnic 
consciousness/identification 
 Homogeneity 
 Cohesion within group  
 Cultural solidarity: within group, 
with kin abroad 
 Self-confidence 
Integration 
 Attachment to country of 
settlement/”Assimilation 
 Command of majority language 
 Citizenship status  
 Group-specific media 
 Type and characteristics of the 
political system: 
 Democratic or authoritarian 
regime? Proportional 
representation or majority rule? 
 Power division between different 
actors in the foreign policy-making 
process, e.g., the role of the 
President 
 Permeability to (ethnic) interest 
group influence 
 Legitimacy of (ethnic) interest 
group activism 
 Legacy of successful (ethnic) 
interest group activism 
 Efficacy of the system 
 Relations between country of 
origin and country of settlement 
 International power relations 
 Transformative events/Times of 
Crisis 
(3) INTEREST GROUP  Interests shared with policy-
makers? 
 Public support of interests? 
Strategies/tactics 
 Proximate aim of interaction: 
persuasion; pressure 
 Raising level of issue legitimacy 
 Mobilisation/influencing public 
opinion: e.g., via courts, media, 
legislature, and other institutions 
of national scope 
 Direct vs. indirect lobbying 
 Agenda-setting/Framing 
 Political representation: by 
voting, campaign financing or 
direct representation (through 
members or sympathisers of 
ethnic community, individual 
legislators or those gathered in 
Congressional Caucuses)  
 Electoral “punishment” 
 Gaining access to lawmakers 
 Educative function: providing 
information, e.g., through 
monitoring policy developments, 
policy analysis, policy oversight 
 Corruption 
 Boycott 
 Hiring professional lobbyists 
 Coalition-building 
External relations 
 Domestic coalition-
building/competition/count
ervailing power: 
 With foreign policy institutions 
and legislators 
 With other (ethnic/non-ethnic 
interest groups) 
 With the media 
 Transnational relations 
with country of origin: 
 Relationship with government 
(adversarial or mutually 
supportive?) 
 Relationship with civil society 
 Transnational relations 
with international 
organizations 
Institutional characteristics 
 Type of organisation 
 Scope of organisation 
 Organisational strength and unity: 
 Size 
 Financial resources 
 Membership unity 
 Leadership: strength, skills, type 
Interests/Agenda 
 Type of interests: 
 Strategic, economic, normative, 
moralistic/humanitarian? 
 “high” or “low” politics?  
 Scope: broad or narrow focus?  
 Salience 
 Position of interest group: 
 Homogeneous or heterogeneous 
agenda?  
 Change or preservation of status 
quo?  
 Positions of external actors: 
 Relation between ethnic interest 
and national/strategic interests 
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FIGURE 1A. “Vereenvoudigde weergave van het network van Turkse organisaties in Nederland” 
[Simplified representation of the network of Turkish organizations in Netherlands]. (source: Van 
Heelsum & Tillie 1999, 20)  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
